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For centuries, most international trade involved an exchange of complete goods. But, with recent improvements
in transportation and communications technology, it increasingly entails different countries adding
value to global supply chains, or what might be called "trade in tasks." We propose a new conceptualization
of the global production process that focuses on tradable tasks and use it to study how falling costs
of offshoring affect factor prices in the source country. We identify a productivity effect of task trade
that benefits the factor whose tasks are more easily moved offshore. In the light of this effect, reductions
in the cost of trading tasks can generate shared gains for all domestic factors, in contrast to the distributional
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The nature of international trade has changed. For centuries, trade largely entailed an ex-
change of complete goods. Now it increasingly involves bits of value being added in many
diﬀerent locations, or what might be called trade in tasks. The familiar paradigm of trade
theory–which conceptualizes the production process as generating ﬁnished goods from bun-
dles of inputs combined at a single plant–was well suited for studying the trade of yesteryear.
But the globalization of production and the evolving international division of labor suggest
the need for a new paradigm, one that puts task trade at center stage.
Adam Smith famously described the division of labor in an English pin factory of the late
eighteenth century. As he noted, the key to high productivity is specialization by task; by
performing a single operation repeatedly, each worker can improve his “dexterity” and the
enterprise can thereby maximize its average output. Since transportation and communication
were exceedingly slow and costly in Adam Smith’s time. specialization required proximity,
so that workers’ activities could be coordinated and their partially processed output shared.
The industrial factory was a critical organizational advance that enabled ﬁrms to reap the
productivity gains from the division of labor.
For most of the subsequent two centuries, the high cost of moving instructions and goods
dictated agglomeration in production. But revolutionary advances in transportation and
(especially) communications technology have weakened the link between specialization and
geographic concentration, making it increasingly viable to separate tasks in time and space.
When instructions can be delivered instantaneously, components and unﬁnished goods can
be moved quickly and cheaply, and the output of many tasks can be conveyed electronically,
ﬁrms can take advantage of factor cost disparities in diﬀerent countries without sacriﬁcing the
gains from specialization. The result has been a boom in “oﬀshoring” of both manufacturing
tasks and other business functions. In this paper, we develop a simple and tractable model
of oﬀshoring that features such trade in tasks.
Hard evidence on the growing scale of task trade is diﬃcult to come by, for several
reasons. First, trade data are collected and reported as gross ﬂows rather than as foreign
value added, making it diﬃcult to attribute tasks to the countries where they were performed.
Second, some of this trade–especially the tasks involving businesses services–leaves no paper
2trail.1 Notwithstanding these measurement problems, hints of the global disintegration of the
production process abound.2 For example the OECD estimates trade ﬂows of intermediate
goods by assuming that the ratio of imported inputs to domestically produced inputs in
a particular industry category matches the ratio of total imports to total domestic output
in that category, Using their data, we calculate that the share of imported inputs in total
inputs used by goods-producing sectors in the United States rose from 7 percent in 1972
to 18 percent in 2000. Intra-ﬁrm trade, which mostly reﬂects the international division of
labor within multinational enterprises, accounted for 47 percent of U.S. total imports in
2005, and is growing rapidly in recent years for U.S. trade with China and several other
Asian countries. As for evidence on the oﬀshoring of tasks that do not require the shipment
of physical products, many commentators have focused on trade in Business, Professional
and Technical (BPT) services, a category that includes such activities as accounting and
bookkeeping, information and data processing, computer programming, and management
and consulting services. In the United States, imports of BPT services have increased by
more than 66 percent in real terms in the seven years from 1997 to 2004.3
Of course, much has been written about oﬀshoring.4 Part of this literature focuses on a
ﬁrm’s choice of organizational form.5 Researchers have asked: When will a ﬁrm choose to
be vertically integrated and when will it buy customized components from an arms-length
supplier? If a ﬁrm engages in outsourcing, when will it choose a domestic partner and when a
foreign partner? And how should a ﬁrm arrange its hierarchical production teams to facilitate
intra-ﬁrm information ﬂows? Although these are interesting questions, the models used to
1See National Research Council (2006) and Government Accountability Oﬃce (2004) for in-depth discus-
sions of the problems that arise in measuring oﬀshoring.
2Many researchers have provided evidence that bears on the increasing globalization of the production
process. See, for example, Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1998), Yeats (2001),
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001, 2005).
3The OECD STAN database provides data on the share of imported inputs in total inputs, and on the
value of trade in various services categories, for some countries. Between 1990 and 2000 the share of imported
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and 0.5 pp in the United States, while it decreased by 2.6 pp in the United Kingdom. Between 1993 and 2003,
real imports of ‘Other Business Services,’ which include accounting, business management, and consulting,
increased by 41% in Canada, 32% in France, 46% in Germany, 102% in the United States, and 116% in the
United Kindom, while they decreased by 45% in Austria and 30% in Japan.
4The terms oﬀshoring and outsourcing are sometimes used interchangeably, but we believe that such usage
is confusing. We prefer to use “oﬀshoring” to mean the performance of tasks in a country diﬀerent from
where a ﬁrm’s headquarters are located and reserve “outsourcing” for the performance of tasks under some
contractual arrangement by an unrelated party. Thus, oﬀshoring can be conducted in-house or at arms-length,
while outsourcing can be performed in a domestic or foreign location.
5See, for example, McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004, 2005), Antràs (2003), Marin and
Verdier (2003a, 2003b), Antràs and Helpman (2004), and Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
3address them tend to be complex, incorporating imperfect information and subtle contracting
or matching problems, and so the general equilibrium structure has been kept to a bare
minimum. For the most part, this research has not focused on the overall implications of the
disintegration of the production process for resource allocation, welfare, and the distribution
of income.
Another branch of literature models “fragmentation” as the breakdown of a production
process for some good into two component parts.6 Initially, the good can be produced
according to a standard, integrated production function. Subsequently, it becomes possible to
generate output by performing each of two exogenously-speciﬁed sub-processes, or fragments.
These fragments, it is assumed, can be separated in space. The authors have studied how
technological improvements of this sort aﬀect trade ﬂows, welfare, and factor prices. This
research poses apt questions and generates some interesting examples and insights. But,
results depend on details about which production process can be disintegrated, whether factor
price equalization holds initially, and what are the absolute and relative factor endowments in
each country in relation to world demands for the various goods. It is not easy to glean general
principles from the cases that have been considered. Nor do the models lend themselves
readily to analysis of new issues, because ﬁrms in the model make no marginal decisions
about how to organize production and there are many diﬀerent conﬁgurations that could
characterize an equilibrium. Moreover, the modeling of fragmentation as a discrete choice
makes it diﬃcult to study the evolution of task trade over time.
Our approach begins with a diﬀerent conceptualization of the production process. We
assume that the production of every good requires the performance of a continuum of tasks
by each of the factors of production. By highlighting the tasks needed to generate output,
we allow for the possibility that tasks might be performed in diﬀerent locations and that the
organization of production can be varied continuously. In our model, ﬁrms are motivated
to oﬀshore tasks by the prospect of factor-cost savings. But they recognize that some tasks
can be performed remotely more easily than others. The set of tasks that are traded in each
industry is determined endogenously so that the cost of the marginal task is equalized across
locations.7
6See, for example, Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001), Deardorﬀ (2001a, 2001b) and Kohler (2004).
7Feenstra and Hanson (1996) use a related approach to study an economy in which ﬁnal goods are assembled
using a continuum of intermediate goods produced with low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor and capital. Their
conceptualization diﬀers from ours in that what determines the set of goods produced abroad is not the diﬀerent
trading costs of intermediate goods but only the countries’s factor endowments, since all intermediate goods
4Several authors have pondered the characteristics of tasks that are good candidates for
oﬀshoring. For example, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2002) distinguish “routine” tasks that
can be well described by deductive rules from “nonroutine” tasks that require pattern recog-
nition and inductive reasoning. Levy and Murnane (2004) argue that the routine tasks are
easier to move oﬀshore than the others, because the relevant information can be exchanged
with fewer misunderstandings.8 Similarly, Leamer and Storper (2001) draw a distinction
between tasks that require codiﬁable information and those that require tacit information.
The former, they argue, are more suitable to perform at a distance, because instructions can
be expressed in symbols and headquarters can more easily monitor whether the indicated
steps have been followed. Communication of tacit information, in contrast, requires that
parties “know” one another and is best accomplished when they have a shared experiential
background. It is often more diﬃcult to monitor successful completion of tasks that require
tacit understanding, so that relationships and frequent contact become more critical for good
performance. Finally, Blinder (2006) develops an alternative dichotomy between activities
that require physical contact and geographic proximity and those that generate outputs that
can be delivered impersonally and from a distance. All of these authors stress the point that
there is a less than perfect relationship between the suitability of a task for oﬀshoring and
the level of skill required to perform the job. For the purposes of our simple model, we do
not need to subscribe to any particular explanation for why some tasks can be performed
remotely more eﬀectively than others. Rather, we just need to accept that tasks diﬀer in this
respect even if the skills required to perform them are the same. Our framework can readily
capture the reality that task trade takes place at diﬀerent skill levels.
Our approach can accommodate any number of sectors, any number of primary factors,
and a variety of market structures. But, to keep matters simple, we develop the model
in Section 2 with two industries, perfect competition, and an arbitrary number of factors
greater than one. We use the model in the remainder of the paper to address an important
and topical question, namely: How do improvements in the opportunities for oﬀshoring aﬀect
are traded costelessly. Yi (2003) studies trade in intermediate goods in a model where trading these partially
processed goods, not tasks, is costly.
8Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) study the formation of international teams in which low skill
agents perform routine tasks and high skill agents perform non-routine, cognitive tasks. In this setting, the
equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous matching of high skill agents (managers) in the North and low
skill agents (workers) in the South. In other words, the oﬀshoring of routine tasks is an equilibrium outcome.
5the wages of diﬀerent types of labor?
The information technology revolution and other innovations have facilitated task trade
across a wide range of industries that produce very diﬀerent types of goods and services.
Indeed, some back-oﬃce functions such as bookkeeping and customer relations are common
to most industries and are candidates for oﬀshoring in all of them. No doubt the improvements
in communication and transportation technology have reduced the costs of oﬀshoring more
in some industries than in others. But, we know of no evidence that suggests a systematic
relationship between the ease of oﬀshoring a given fraction of, say, low-skill tasks and the
overall skill intensity of the industry. Accordingly, we choose as our baseline assumption that
the distribution of trade costs for tasks requiring a given skill level is the same in the two
industries. We model the technological advancements in communication and transportation
as a proportional reduction in the cost of oﬀshoring tasks requiring a given skill level across
both sectors of the economy.
In Section 3, we derive a useful decomposition of the impact of an economy-wide decrease
in the cost of oﬀshoring low-skill tasks on the wages of low-skilled workers. In general, a
fall in oﬀshoring costs for low-skill tasks induces a productivity eﬀect,arelative-price eﬀect
and a labor-supply eﬀect on low-skill wages. The productivity eﬀect derives from the cost
savings that ﬁrms enjoy when prospects for oﬀshoring improve. This eﬀect is present in
all trading environments in which oﬀshoring already is taking place and it always works to
the beneﬁt of low-skilled labor. A relative-price eﬀect occurs when a fall in oﬀshoring costs
alters a large country’s terms of trade. The relative price of a good moves in the opposite
direction to the change in its relative world supply. Such price movements are mirrored by
movements in relative cost, and have implications for wages that are familiar from traditional
trade theories. Finally, the labor-supply eﬀect operates in general-equilibrium environments
in which factor prices respond to factor supplies at given relative prices. This eﬀect derives
from the reabsorption of workers who formerly performed tasks that are now carried out
abroad.
In the succeeding three subsections we examine these eﬀects in more detail. Section 3.1
highlights the productivity eﬀect in a small, Heckscher-Ohlin economy. In a small economy,
the terms of trade are, of course, ﬁxed, so there is no relative-price eﬀect. And, with two
factors of production and two produced goods, wages do not respond to factor supplies,
so the labor-supply eﬀect vanishes. This leaves the positive productivity eﬀect as the only
remaining force. We show that improvements in the technology for oﬀshoring low-skill tasks
6are isomorphic in this case to (low-skilled) labor-augmenting technological progress and that,
surprisingly, the real wage for low-skilled labor must rise. In Section 3.2, we introduce the
relative-price eﬀect by focusing on a large, Heckscher-Ohlin economy. Again, there is no
labor-supply eﬀect and again a reduction in the cost of oﬀshoring low-skill tasks is like (low-
skilled) labor-augmenting technological progress in the source country. This time, however,
the relative price of the skill-intensive good rises, which generates a countervailing eﬀect on
real wages of low-skilled workers via the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism. Finally, in Section
3.3, we investigate the labor-supply eﬀect, which is present whenever there are more factors
than produced goods. The simplest such environment arises when the advanced country
specializes in the production of a single good. We derive simple formulas for the productivity
eﬀect and the labor-supply eﬀect on low-skill wages and discuss conditions under which each is
likely to dominate. We show that the productivity eﬀect is small when the range of oﬀshored
tasks is small, but it can exceed the labor-supply eﬀect when the initial volume of task trade
is large.
Arguably, public concerns about oﬀshoring in advanced countries have been inspired by
the out-migration of white-collar positions in computer programming, accounting, and the
like. In Section 4, we introduce the possibility of oﬀshoring tasks that require skilled labor.
As such oﬀshoring becomes more economical, a productivity eﬀect bolsters the income of
high-skilled workers in the advanced countries. As with the oﬀshoring of low-skill tasks, this
positive eﬀect must be weighed against the relative-price and factor-supply eﬀects, which are
present in some environments. An interesting case to consider is one in which the ease of
oﬀshoring is independent of the skill level of the task. Then, in a large economy, a reduction
in oﬀshoring costs boosts the productivity of all factors similarly, so reductions in oﬀshoring
costs are equivalent to Hicks-neutral technological progress.
We summarize our results in a concluding section and discuss other potential uses of our
framework. An appendix treats the technical complications that can arise when the cost of
oﬀshoring some tasks is the same as that for others.
2 Toward a New Paradigm
We conceptualize the production process in terms of tasks. Each task requires the input of
some factor of production. Some tasks can be performed by workers who have relatively little
education or training, while others must be performed by workers who have greater skills.
7We refer to the former as “L-tasks” and the latter as “H-tasks.” There may be still other
tasks that are performed by other factors of production; for example, capital, or additional
categories of labor.
Firms in the home country can produce two goods, X and Y , with constant returns to
scale. The production of a unit of either good involves a continuum of L-tasks, a continuum
of H-tasks, and possibly other sets of tasks as well. Without loss of generality, we normalize
the measure of tasks in each industry, and employing a given factor of production, to equal
one. Moreover, we deﬁne the tasks so that, in any industry, those that can be performed by a
given factor require similar amounts of that factor when performed at home. In other words,
if L-tasks i and i0 are undertaken at home in the course of producing good j,t h e nﬁrms use
the same amount of domestic low-skilled labor to perform task i as they do to perform task
i0.9 The industries may diﬀer in their factor intensities, which means, for example, that a
typical L-task in one industry may use a greater input of domestic low-skilled labor than an
L-task in the other industry.
It is easiest to describe the production technology for the case in which substitution
between the diﬀerent tasks is impossible. We begin with this case and introduce the oppor-
tunities for oﬀshoring. Then we return to the issue of task substitution and describe a more
ﬂexible technology.
If a production technology admits no substitution between factors or tasks, then each
task must be performed at a ﬁxed intensity in order to produce a unit of output. That is,
each of the unit measure of L-tasks must be performed exactly “once” in order to produce a
unit of output of good j, and similarly for each of the H-tasks and each of any other types
of tasks that are part of the production process.10 In industry j,aﬁrm needs afj units of
domestic factor f to perform a typical f-task once. Since the measure of f-tasks has been
normalized to one for f = {L,H,...}, afj also is the total amount of domestic factor f that
would be needed to produce a unit of good j in the absence of any oﬀshoring. We will take
industry X to be relatively skill intensive, which means that aHx/aLx >a Hy/aLy.
Firms can undertake tasks at home or abroad. Tasks can be performed oﬀshore either
within or beyond the boundaries of the ﬁrm. Much of the recent literature on oﬀshoring
9I fo n et a s kn e e d e dt op r o d u c es o m eg o o dr e q u i r e st w i c e as much labor as another, we can always consider
the former to be two tasks when assigning indexes to the tasks.
10We place quotation marks around “once,” because there is no natural measure of the intensity of task
performance.
8distinguishes between ﬁrms that are vertically integrated and those that contract out for
certain activities. There are many interesting questions about ﬁrms’ choices of organizational
form, but we shall neglect them here for the sake of simplicity. Rather, we assume that a
ﬁrm needs the same amount of a foreign factor whether it performs a given activity in a
foreign subsidiary or it outsources the activity to a foreign supplier. In either case, the factor
requirement is dictated by the nature of the task and by the ﬁrm’s production technology.
As we noted in the introduction, some tasks are more diﬃcult to oﬀshore than others.
T h ec o s to fo ﬀshoring a task may reﬂect how diﬃcult it is to describe using rules-based logic,
how important it is that the task be delivered personally, how diﬃcult it is to transmit or
transport the output of the activity, or all of the above (and more). For our purposes, we
simply need to recognize these diﬀerences, as we take the costs of oﬀshoring the various tasks
to be exogenous. For the time being, we focus sharply on the oﬀshoring of tasks performed
by low-skilled labor by assuming that it is prohibitively costly to separate all other tasks from
the headquarters. We will examine the oﬀshoring of high-skill tasks in Section 4.
We index the L-tasks in an industry by i ∈ [0,1] and order them so that the costs of
oﬀshoring are non-decreasing. A simple way to model the oﬀshoring costs is in terms of input
requirements: A ﬁrm producing good j that performs task i abroad requires aLjβtj(i) units
of foreign labor, where β is a shift parameter that we will use in Section 3 and beyond to
study improvements in the technology for oﬀshoring. We assume that tj(·) is continuously
diﬀerentiable and that βtj(i) ≥ 1 for all i and j. Our ordering of the tasks implies that
t0
j(i) ≥ 0. In the main text we will go further in taking this schedule to be strictly increasing,
because this simpliﬁes the exposition considerably. The appendix takes up the case in which
t h es c h e d u l eh a sﬂat portions.11
I nw h i c hi n d u s t r yi si te a s i e rt oo ﬀshore the tasks performed by low-skilled labor? Note
that this is diﬀerent from asking whether it is easier to oﬀshore tasks performed by low-skilled
labor or those performed by high-skilled labor. The two industries may share a set of common
L-tasks–such as data entry, call center operations, and simple record-keeping and inventory
control–for which the costs of oﬀshoring are similar. Other tasks performed by low-skilled
labor may diﬀer across industries, but we know of no evidence to suggest that such tasks
11The tj(·) schedule has a ﬂa tp o r t i o nw h e naﬁnite measure of tasks is equally costly to trade. On the one
hand, this would seem possible in the light of Footnote 9, where we note that the “same” task may receive
multiple indexes in order that all tasks use the same amount of a factor. On the other hand, if tasks are
perfectly divisible into ﬁner sub-tasks that are not exactly the same, then it may be plausible to assume that
all ﬁnite measures of tasks bear slightly diﬀerent oﬀshoring costs.
9can more readily be moved oﬀshore in labor-intensive sectors than in skill-intensive sectors
(or vice versa). And improvements in transportation and communications technology have
spurred the rapid growth of oﬀshoring in a wide range of sectors. For this reason, we take
as our benchmark the case in which oﬀshoring costs are similar in the two industries; i.e.,
tx(i)=ty(i)=t(i). But we will brieﬂy address other possibilities in Section 3.1.
We return now to the issue of factor and task substitution. Our framework can readily
accommodate substitution between L-tasks and H-tasks (or tasks that use other factors) and
substitution among the tasks that use a particular factor. But, to keep matters simple, we
introduce only the former type of substitution in this paper.12 The production technology
may allow a ﬁrm to vary the intensities of L-tasks and H-tasks (and any other tasks) that
it performs to produce a unit of output. For example, a ﬁrm might conduct the set of
assembly (L) tasks repeatedly and oversight (H) tasks rarely, and accept thereby a relatively
low average productivity of low-skilled labor, or it might conserve on assembly tasks by
monitoring the low-skilled workers more intensively. The intensity of task performance is
captured in our framework by the amount of the domestic factor that is used to perform
a typical task at home. When substitution between L-tasks and H-tasks (and any others)
is possible, aLj and aHj become choice variables for the ﬁrms, who select these variables
to minimize cost subject to a constraint that the chosen combination of task intensities are
suﬃcient to yield a unit of output. A ﬁrm that chooses aLj for the intensity of its L-tasks
must employ aLjβt(i) units of foreign labor to perform task i oﬀshore.
We are ready to describe an equilibrium with trade in goods and tasks. Let w and
w∗ be, respectively, the home and foreign wage of low-skilled workers, and suppose that
w>β t(0)w∗,s ot h a ti ti sp r o ﬁtable to oﬀs h o r es o m et a s k s .F i r m so ﬀshore L-tasks in order
to take advantage of the lower foreign wage, but they bear a cost for doing so that varies
with the nature of the task. In each industry, the marginal task performed at home has an
index I such that the wage savings just balance the oﬀshoring costs, or
w = βt(I)w∗ .( 1 )
In a competitive industry, the price of consumer good j is less than or equal to the unit
12Substitution among the tasks that use a particular factor could be introduced by assuming that such
tasks generate an aggregate input that might, for example, be modeled as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
function of the intensity with which each task is performed. Qualitative results similar to those derived here
will apply whenever the substitution among tasks using a given factor is less than perfect.
10cost of production, with equality whenever a positive quantity of the good is produced. The
unit cost of producing good j is the sum of the wages paid to domestic low-skilled labor, the
wages paid to foreign labor for tasks performed oﬀshore, the wages paid to domestic skilled
labor for the unit measure of H-tasks, and the payments to any other factors of production.
Considering ﬁrms’ optimal choices of intensity aLj, aHj, etc. and the optimal oﬀshoring of
L-tasks, we have
pj ≤ waLj(·)(1− I)+w∗aLj(·)
Z I
0
βt(i)di + saHj(·)+... ,f o r j = x,y,( 2 )
where s denotes the high-skill wage and the arguments in the function for the factor intensity
aFj (which have been suppressed for the time being) are the relative costs of the various sets
of tasks when they are located optimally. Notice that the wage bill for domestic low-skilled
labor reﬂects the fraction 1−I of L-tasks that are performed at home and that the wage bill
for foreign low-skilled workers includes the costs of the “extra” inputs that are needed to do
their jobs from a distance; i.e., the costs of oﬀshoring. The “dots” at the end of the inequality
leave open the possibility that there may be additional factors and additional tasks besides
those performed by low-skilled and high-skilled labor.
By substituting for w∗ using (1), we can rewrite (2) as
pj ≤ waLj(·)Ω(I)+saHj(·)+... ,f o r j = x,y,( 3 )
where





The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (3) is the total cost of the unit measure of L-tasks
in light of the proﬁt-maximizing geographic allocation of these tasks. Notice that this cost
is proportional to the chosen (or technologically ﬁxed) intensity of task performance, with
proportionality factor wΩ(I).T h u s ,wΩ(I) is the average cost of the low-skilled labor used
to perform L-tasks, while s is the average cost of the skilled labor used to perform H-tasks.
These average factor costs are the arguments in the afj(·) functions, because the tasks using
a given factor are performed in ﬁxed combination. Notice too that t0(i) > 0 for all i ∈ [0,1]
implies Ω(I) < 1 for I>0;i . e . ,o ﬀshoring reduces the wage bill in proportion to the cost of
performing all L-tasks at home, as long as ﬁrms oﬀs h o r es o m et a s k s .
Next consider the domestic factor markets. The market for low-skilled labor clears when
11employment by the two industries in the tasks performed at home exhausts the domestic
factor supply, L.E a c hﬁrm completes a fraction 1 − I of L-tasks at home and an L-task in
industry j employs aLj units of labor per unit of output. Letting x and y denote the outputs
of the two industries, we have (1 − I)aLx(·)x +( 1− I)aLy(·)y = L,o r




This way of writing the market-clearing condition highlights the fact that oﬀshoring leverages
the domestic factor supply. For skilled labor, H, we have the usual
aHx(·)x + aHy(·)y = H ,( 5 )
because we are assuming for the time being that tasks requiring skilled labor cannot be
performed remotely. Conditions analogous to (5) apply for any additional factors that may
take part in the production process.
Lastly, we have the markets for consumer goods. We assume as usual that households
have identical and homothetic preferences around the globe and take good X as numeraire.
If the home country is small in relation to the size of world markets, the relative price p can
be treated as exogenous by the domestic economy. If the home country is large, the relative
price is determined by an equation of world relative demands and world relative supplies. We
shall refrain from writing this equation explicitly until we need it in Section 3.2 below.
3 D e c o m p o s i n gt h eW a g eE ﬀects of Oﬀshoring
The Internet allows nearly instantaneous transmission of information and documents. Cel-
lular telephones connect remote locations that have limited access to land lines. Telecon-
ferencing provides an ever closer approximation to face-to-face contact. These innovations
and more have dramatically reduced the cost of oﬀshoring. We model such technological
improvements as a decline in β and use comparative-static methods to examine their eﬀects.
In this paper, we are most interested in the eﬀects of oﬀshoring on domestic factor
prices. Before proceeding to particular trading environments, we identify the various channels
through which changes in the opportunities for oﬀshoring aﬀect the wages of low-skilled and
high-skilled labor. Our decomposition results from diﬀerentiating the system of zero-proﬁt
and factor-market clearing conditions and taking Ω, p and I as exogenous variables for the
12moment. Of course, these variables are endogenous to the full equilibrium, and we shall treat
them as such in the subsequent analysis.
When both industries are active, the pair of zero-proﬁt conditions in (3) hold as equalities.
These two equations, together with the factor-market clearing conditions that apply for all of
the inelastically-supplied factors, allow us to express the vector of domestic factor prices and
the two output levels as functions of p, I,a n dΩ. After totally diﬀerentiating this system of
2+v equations (where v is the number of factors), we can write the expression for the (log)
change in the wage of low-skilled labor as




We call the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (6) the productivity eﬀect. As the technol-
ogy for oﬀshoring improves (dβ < 0), the cost of performing the set of L-tasks declines in both
industries (ˆ Ω < 0).13 A ﬁrm’s cost savings are proportional to its payments to low-skilled
labor. These savings are much the same as would result from an economy-wide increase in
the productivity of low-skilled labor, hence the term we have chosen to describe the eﬀect.
The boost in productivity raises ﬁrms’ demand for low-skilled labor, which tends to inﬂate
their wages, much as would labor-augmenting technological progress.
The second term on the right-hand side of (6) is the relative-price eﬀect.Ac h a n g ei nt h e
ease of oﬀshoring often will alter the equilibrium terms of trade. If the relative price of the
labor-intensive good Y falls, this typically will exert downward pressure on the low-skill wage
via the mechanism that is familiar from Stolper and Samuelson (1941). Since improvements
in the technology for oﬀshoring generate greater cost savings in labor-intensive industries
than in skill-intensive industries, ceteris paribus, a fall in β often will induce a fall in the
relative price of the labor-intensive good (ˆ p<0). So, the relative-price eﬀect typically works
to the disadvantage of low-skilled labor, as we will see in Section 3.2.
We refer to the ﬁnal term in (6) as the labor-supply eﬀect. As technological improvements
in communications and transportation cause the oﬀshoring of L-tasks to expand, (dI > 0),
this frees up domestic low-skilled labor that otherwise would perform these tasks. These











which is zero when I =0and negative when I>0.
13workers must be reabsorbed into the economy, which may (but need not) contribute to a
decline in their wages. We see in equation (4) that the domestic economy operates as if it
had a labor supply of L/(1 − I), which means that an expansion of oﬀshoring of dI/(1 − I)
increases the eﬀective supply of low-skilled labor by a similar amount as would a given
percentage growth in the domestic labor supply L.
We can also decompose the eﬀects of a decline in the costs of oﬀshoring L-tasks on the
income of high-skilled labor. Analogous to (6), we ﬁnd




Notice that there is no productivity eﬀect. This is because a fall in β reduces ﬁrms’ costs
of performing their L-tasks, without any direct eﬀect on the cost of performing tasks that
require high-skilled labor. So, there is no direct boost to productivity of these skilled workers,
although there may be indirect eﬀects that result from changes in factor proportions and
changes in relative prices. We write the relative-price eﬀect with the opposite sign to that
in (6), because, at least in a two-factor model, a movement in relative prices pushes the two
factor prices in opposite directions. Similarly, we write the labor-supply eﬀect with a positive
sign. Often, an increase in the eﬀective supply of low-skilled labor such as the one that results
from increased oﬀshoring will raise the low-skill to high-skill employment ratios in the various
industries, thereby increasing the marginal product of skilled labor. However, as we know
from standard analyses of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, a change in relative factor supplies
may be accommodated by a change in the composition of output, without any response of
factor proportions in any industry. In such circumstances, we will have μ2 = μ4 =0 .
We turn now to some speciﬁc trading environments, where these eﬀects can be isolated
and understood more fully. In so doing, we study a full equilibrium in which all relevant
variables are treated as endogenous.
3.1 The Productivity Eﬀect
The productivity eﬀect may seem counterintuitive, because it works to the beneﬁto ft h e
factor whose tasks are being moved oﬀs h o r e . B u ti ta r i s e sq u i t eg e n e r a l l yi na l lt r a d i n g
environments, and it easily can dominate the other eﬀects of task trade on domestic wages.
We devote this section to studying it in some detail.
The productivity eﬀects is seen most clearly in a small Heckscher-Ohlin economy. Consider
14an economy that takes the relative price p and the foreign wage w∗ as given and that produces
output with only two factors, L and H. As before, output requires unit measures of L-tasks
and H-tasks, and only the former tasks can be moved oﬀshore at reasonable cost.
Assuming that both industries are active in equilibrium, the zero-proﬁt conditions imply14
1=ΩwaLx (Ωw/s)+saHx(Ωw/s) (8)
and
p = ΩwaLy (Ωw/s)+saHy(Ωw/s) .( 9 )
Here, we have made explicit the dependence of the production techniques on the relative
average factor costs, Ωw/s,i nv i e wo ft h ep r o ﬁt-maximizing choice of oﬀshoring dictated by
(1). Since the industries diﬀer in factor intensities, these two equations uniquely determine
Ωw and s, independently of β.T h u s ,a sβ falls, ˆ w = −ˆ Ω and ˆ s =0 . We conclude that the
productivity eﬀect is the only eﬀect that operates in the present setting.15 The relative-price
eﬀects are absent (μ1 = μ3 =0 ), because terms of trade are exogenous in a small economy.
And the labor-supply eﬀects are absent (μ2 = μ4 =0 ), because factor prices are insensitive
to factor supplies (at given commodity prices) in an economy with equal numbers of primary
factors and produced goods.
We can compute the magnitude of the productivity eﬀect by combining ˆ w = −ˆ Ω(I) and
ˆ w = ˆ β+ˆ t(I), which follows from (1) and the fact that w∗ is ﬁxed for a small country. Solving
this pair of equations gives





We see that the productivity eﬀect is zero when I =0 , but strictly positive for all I>0.
Thus, low-skilled labor beneﬁts from improvements in the technology for oﬀshoring L-tasks
14To simplify notation, we suppress the arguments of functions whenever this dependence is clear from the
context (e.g., we write Ω instead of Ω(I)).
15The exercise that we are undertaking here is somewhat artiﬁcial inasmuch as we consider a change in
technology that reduces the cost of oﬀshoring in a single, small economy while holding goods prices and
foreign wages ﬁxed. This situation can arise only when the costs of oﬀshoring do not also change in other
countries besides the small one under consideration that in aggregate are large. Such a scenario would not
be an apt description of the recent boom in oﬀshoring triggered by the information technology revolution.
Krugman (2000) makes a similar point in his critique of Leamer’s (1998, 2000) small-country analysis of the
eﬀects of factor-biased technological change on factor prices. We intend the small-country analysis only as a
pedagogic device that lays bare the source of the productivity eﬀect, not as a realistic description of the recent
experience with oﬀshoring of any small, industrialized country.
15whenever some task trade already occurs. Moreover, the wage gain from a given percentage
reduction in oﬀshoring costs increases monotonically with I if η(i) ≡ t0(i)(1− i)/t(i) < 1 for
all i,o ri fη(i) is constant (i.e., t(i)=( 1− i)
−η). When one of these conditions is satisﬁed,
it guarantees that the costs of oﬀshoring do not rise ‘too’ fast with i.T h e n∂ˆ Ω/∂I < 0 and
∂ ˆ w/∂I > 0.
How can low-skilled workers beneﬁt when it becomes easier to move the tasks they perform
oﬀshore? To answer this question, consider the cost savings generated by an improvement
in the technology for oﬀshoring. Firms’ costs fall for two reasons. First, the ﬁrms elect to
relocate tasks that previously were carried out at home. Second, ﬁrms save on inframarginal
tasks that were conducted abroad even before the drop in β. The envelope theorem implies
that the ﬁrst source of savings is negligible for a small change in β. But the second source of
s a v i n g si so ft h eﬁrst order, provided that there exist some inframarginal tasks (i.e., I>0).
The sectoral composition of these cost savings explains the ultimate gain by domestic, low-
skilled labor.
F i r m si nb o t hi n d u s t r i e sb e n e ﬁt at the initial factor prices from the reduction in β.B u t
t h ei n c r e a s ei np r o ﬁtability is greater in the labor-intensive sector than in the skill-intensive
sector, because a ﬁrm’s savings are proportional to the share of L-tasks in its total costs.
Therefore, the labor-intensive industry enjoys the greater increase in proﬁtability at the
initial factor prices. As it expands relative to the skill-intensive sector, the economy-wide
demand for low-skilled labor grows. Only when the domestic wage rises to fully oﬀset the
induced increase in productivity can the proﬁt opportunities in both industries simultaneously
be eliminated. In the process, the wage of high-skilled labor is left unchanged. Again, we
see the strong analogy between improved opportunities for oﬀshoring and labor-augmenting
technological progress.
It is instructive to compare the incidence of a decline in the cost of oﬀshoring with that of
a fall in the cost of immigration. Both generate an expansion in the pool of labor available to
perform L-tasks and both spell an increase in the fraction of these tasks that are performed
by foreign-born labor. Yet, we would argue, the implications for domestic wages are very
diﬀerent. Suppose, for the sake of this comparison, that foreign workers can stay in their
(large) native country and earn the wage w∗, or they can move to the home country at the
cost of a fraction of their working time. Let this cost vary across individuals, so that potential
immigrant i captures only the fraction 1/βτ(i) of the domestic wage w when he moves to
the high-wage country. Assume that foreign workers employed in the home country are
16equally productive with their domestic counterparts. Then, the marginal immigrant I earns
the same net income in both locations, or w = w∗βτ(I). Note the similarity with equation
(1). However, unless the domestic ﬁrms know the immigrants’ moving costs and can price
discriminate in their wage oﬀers, they will pay the same wage w to all low-skilled immigrant
workers, as well as to all such domestic workers. As the cost of immigration falls, rents accrue
to the immigrants, but not to the domestic ﬁrms. So, there is no increase in proﬁtability
and no pressure for domestic wages to change (as long as the economy remains incompletely
specialized). The diﬀerence between falling costs of oﬀshoring and falling costs of immigration
is that the former create rents for domestic ﬁrms–which ultimately accrue to domestic factors
in the general equilibrium–whereas the latter create rents for the immigrants.
Until now, we have assumed that the distribution of oﬀshoring costs by task is the same
in both industries. What if they are diﬀerent? Suppose ﬁrst that it is only possible to
oﬀshore tasks in the labor-intensive industry and that the technology for oﬀshoring these
tasks improves. This is like labor-augmenting technological progress concentrated in industry
Y . The wage of low-skilled workers will rise by more than the percentage fall in Ωy and the
wage of high-skilled workers will fall.16 In contrast, if the oﬀshoring of L-tasks is possible
only in the skill-intensive industry, then an improvement in the technology for oﬀshoring will
raise the wage of high-skilled labor and reduce that of low-skilled labor. These scenarios are
quite similar to those analyzed by Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), where they considered the
eﬀects of fragmentation of the production process in a single industry. They showed that
technological improvements that make it possible to import a component that formerly had
to be produced at home are like productivity gains in the industry where this occurs. And
they noted the analogy of such fragmentation with industry-speciﬁc technological progress,
which, in a small country, beneﬁts the factor that is used intensively in the industry that
reaps the productivity gains. The main diﬀerence between their result and ours is that they
identify a productivity gain for the industry in which fragmentation occurs, while we associate
16We deﬁne Ωy ≡ 1−Iy +
U Iy
0 ty(i)di/ty(Iy),w h e r eIy is the fraction of tasks performed oﬀshore in industry
Y . It is straightforward to calculate that





> −ˆ Ωy ≥ 0
and




where θfj is the cost share of f-tasks in industry j.
17the productivity gain with the factor performing tasks that become cheaper to trade. When
oﬀshoring costs fall for one factor and in one industry, the implications of the alternative
approaches converge.17
More generally, we can write the wage response to a change in the ease of oﬀshoring that


















where Ωx is deﬁned analogously to Ωy. In the numerator, the productivity gain in the labor-
intensive industry Y is weighted by the factor-share ratio, θHx/θLx, which exceeds the weight
θHy/θLy on the productivity gain in the skill-intensive industry. The denominator is always
positive. Therefore, the low-skill wage rate will rise if the productivity gains are similar in
the two industries, or if that in the labor-intensive sector is larger. The link between a decline
in the cost of task trade and the relative sizes of the productivity gains in the two industries
is, however, not obvious when the industries have diﬀerent trade cost schedules. Take, for
example, the case in which tx(i)=αty(i) a n db o t hs c h e d u l e sa r em u l t i p l i e db yac o m m o n
factor β. Then, as β falls, the cost of oﬀshoring the task with index i falls by the same
percentage amount in both industries (so ˆ Ωx(i)=ˆ Ωy(i) all i) , but since the industries do
not oﬀshore the same fractions of tasks, the productivity gains are not the same. In fact, the
industry in which task trade is less costly oﬀshores a larger fraction of tasks; i.e., Ix >I y
if and only if α<1. But this alone does not guarantee a larger productivity gain for the
industry with the lower cost of oﬀshoring. We deﬁne ηj (i) ≡ t0
j(i)(1− i)/tj(i) for i = x,y,
analogous to our deﬁnition of η(i) above. Then, if ηx and ηy are constants, or if ηx(Ix) < 1
and ηy(Iy) < 1, ˆ Ωj(i) is increasing in i and so the industry with the greater ease of oﬀshoring
will experience the larger productivity gain when β falls.












17See also Leamer (1998, 2000) who emphasizes that the factor bias of technological progress has no bearing
on the implications for factor prices in a small open economy. Rather, what matters for the wage response
is the sector in which the technological progress takes place. But note Krugman’s (2000) critique of the
small-economy assumption in the context of global technological change, as discussed in footnote 15 above.
18Since θLy >θ Lx, skilled labor beneﬁts from a fall in oﬀshoring costs in a small country if
and only if the induced productivity gain in the skill-intensive sector exceeds that in the
labor-intensive sector.
3.2 The Relative-Price Eﬀect
To examine the relative-price eﬀect, we relax the small-country assumption. Now we need
equilibrium conditions for the foreign country and a reason why factor prices diﬀer across
countries. To this end, we assume that indigenous ﬁrms in the foreign country use inferior
technologies. The technology gap generates factor prices that are lower in the foreign coun-
try than those in the home country. Since all task trade is costly, only the ﬁrms in the
technologically-advanced country engage in oﬀshoring. We return to our benchmark case in
which the oﬀshoring of L-tasks has the same distribution of costs in the two industries.
More speciﬁcally, we let A∗ > 1 denote the Hicks-neutral technological inferiority of for-
eign ﬁrms in both industries. This means that, were a foreign ﬁrm to perform all tasks at the
same intensities as a domestic ﬁrm, its output would be only 1/A∗ t i m e sa sg r e a t .A s s u m -




p = A∗w∗aLy (w∗/s∗)+A∗s∗aHy(w∗/s∗) .( 1 1 )
Comparing (8) and (9) with (10) and (11), we see that incomplete specialization in both
countries implies “adjusted factor price equalization”; that is, wΩ = w∗A∗ and s = s∗A∗.
In such an equilibrium, home ﬁrms choose their production techniques based on the rela-
tive average factor costs wΩ/s. Foreign ﬁrms choose theirs based on the relative factor prices
w∗/s∗. Therefore, with adjusted factor price equalization, the cost-minimizing techniques are
the same in the two countries; i.e., afj = a∗
fj. The foreign factor-market clearing conditions
can be written as





A∗aHxx∗ + A∗aHyy∗ = H∗ ,
where x∗ and y∗ are the industry outputs of indigenous foreign ﬁrms in industries X and
Y ,a n dL∗ and H∗ are the foreign endowments of low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Here,
the demand for foreign low-skilled labor comprises three terms: the demand by indigenous
foreign ﬁrms in industry X, the demand by indigenous foreign ﬁrms in industry Y ,a n dt h e
demand by home ﬁrms in both industries that are oﬀshoring the set of L-tasks with indexes
i ≤ I. The demand for foreign high-skilled labor comprises only the demands of the two
foreign industries, because the oﬀshoring of H-tasks still is assumed to be impossible.
Now, we combine the factor-market clearing conditions for the foreign country with those
for the home country to derive expressions for the world outputs of the two goods. We ﬁnd18


























,( 1 3 )
where ∆a = aHxaLy − aLxaHy > 0.
Equilibrium in the goods market requires
y + y∗
x + x∗ = D(p) ,
where D(p) is the (homothetic) world relative demand for good Y , which has the standard
property that D0(p) < 0.
The expressions for world outputs have some interesting implications. First note that





















Now, we can solve for x
∗ and y
∗,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rx and y, and sum the home and foreign outputs of a good
to arrive at the expressions in the text.









Therefore, when the cost of oﬀshoring falls (dβ < 0), home ﬁrms broaden the range of
tasks that they perform oﬀshore (dI > 0).19 This reduces the cost of L-tasks for these
ﬁrms (ˆ Ω < 0), the more so for labor-intensive producers than for skill-intensive producers.
Equations (12) and (13) imply that, as Ω falls, the relative world output of labor-intensive
goods must rise. Finally, since (y + y∗)/(x + x∗) increases and D0(p) < 0, the relative price
of the labor-intensive good falls (ˆ p<0).
The relative-price eﬀect rewards high-skilled labor but harms low-skilled labor, for the
usual (Stolper-Samuelson) reasons. In an incompletely-specialized, Heckscher-Ohlin econ-
omy, there are no labor-supply eﬀects (μ2 = μ4 =0 ), because changes in factor supplies
induce changes in the composition of output, not changes in factor intensities. It follows
that domestic high-skilled labor must gain from an improvement in the technology for oﬀ-
shoring, while domestic low-skilled labor may gain or lose, depending on the relative sizes
of the productivity and relative-price eﬀects and on the share of the labor-intensive good in
the typical consumption basket.20 Note that a fall in the cost of task trade can generate a
Pareto improvement for the home country if the productivity eﬀect is large enough. This is
quite diﬀerent from the consequences of a fall in the cost of goods trade, which necessarily
creates winners and losers.
We highlight one further implication of equations (12) and (13). Notice that the domestic
labor supply enters these expressions for the global outputs only in the form L/Ω. As should
be clear, the analogy between reductions in the cost of oﬀshoring and labor-augmenting
technological progress carries over to the large economy. A decline in β that induces an
expansion of task trade and thus a fall in Ω has exactly the same impact on prices, wages,











0(I) > 0 .
20Note that the real wage of low-skill labor can rise even if w ( m e a s u r e di nt e r m so ft h en u m e r a i r eg o o dx)
falls, because a fall in β induces a decline in the price of good y.
213.3 The Labor-Supply Eﬀect
We have seen that increased oﬀshoring of the tasks performed by low-skilled labor acts, in
part, like an expansion of the domestic labor supply. As more tasks are moved oﬀshore,
domestic low-skilled workers are freed from their jobs and so must ﬁnd new tasks to perform
elsewhere in the economy. Yet, the labor-supply eﬀect on wages has been absent from the
trading environments we have considered so far, because factor prices are insensitive to factor
supplies in an economy that produces as many tradable goods as there are primary factors.
The labor-supply eﬀect operates in any setting with more factors than produced goods.
It would be present, for example, in a small economy that produces two goods with three
f a c t o r s ,s u c ha si nt h ef a m i l i a rs p e c i ﬁc-factors model. However, we can elucidate this eﬀect
more clearly in an even simpler environment. To this end, we consider a small economy as in
Section 3.1 that takes the foreign wage and relative price as given, but one that is specialized
in producing a single good.
Suppose the home country produces only the numeraire good X. Then the zero-proﬁt
condition for this industry implies that equation (8) must hold, whereas the price p is less
than the unit cost of production in industry Y . The factor-market clearing conditions are






aHx(wΩ/s)x = H .( 1 5 )
Consider a decline in the cost of trading tasks (dβ < 0). Diﬀerentiating (8) gives
θLx
³
ˆ w + ˆ Ω
´
+( 1− θLx)ˆ s =0,
while diﬀerentiating the ratio of (14) to (15) implies
σx
³






where σx is the elasticity of substitution between the set of L-tasks and the set of H-tasks
22in the production of good X. Combining these two equations, we ﬁnd that





.( 1 6 )
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (16) is the productivity eﬀect, as before. The second
term is the labor-supply eﬀect on low-skilled wages. The former eﬀect is positive, while the
latter is negative and reﬂects the adjustment in wages necessary for all domestic low-skilled
workers to be employed when performing the smaller set of tasks undertaken in the home
country.
To compare the magnitudes of these oﬀsetting eﬀects, we need to relate −ˆ Ω to dI/(1 − I).
T h i sc a ne a s i l yb ed o n eu s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of Ω(I) or the derivative dΩ/dI reported in


















0 t(i)di +( 1− I)t(I)
is a fraction that is zero at I =0and one at I =1 . The productivity eﬀect is negligible when
I =0but can be large when I>0 and the cost schedule for trading tasks rises steeply. The
labor-supply eﬀect is large when the share of skilled-labor in total costs is large and when H-
tasks substitute poorly for L-tasks in the production process. Clearly, the labor-supply eﬀect
dominates when I =0 , which means that the ﬁrst bit of oﬀshoring drives down the wages of
domestic low-skilled workers. This is because the productivity eﬀect rests on the cost-savings
for inframarginal tasks, and there are no such tasks when the complete production process
initially is performed at home. However, reductions in the cost of task trade that cause
oﬀs h o r i n gt og r o wf r o ma na l r e a d yp o s i t i v el e v e l can produce an increase in low-skill wages
despite the existence of an adverse labor-supply eﬀect. We see that when I>0,af a l li nβ
causes w to rise if and only if σxγη > 1−θLx. Moreover, for some production and oﬀshoring
technologies, a suﬃciently large fall in the costs of oﬀshoring will leave low-skilled labor with
23higher real wages than they would have with no oﬀshoring, despite the initial drop in wages
that results from a small increase in oﬀshoring when I =0 .21
The labor-supply eﬀect that may harm low-skilled workers serves to beneﬁt their high-
skilled compatriots. The high-skilled domestic workers experience no direct productivity
eﬀect, but they enjoy a boost to their marginal product when oﬀshoring becomes less costly,
because the expansion in task trade generates an increase in the intensity with which every







which is positive for all I. Thus, with more factors than goods, skilled-labor always gains
when the cost of oﬀshoring L-tasks falls.
4O ﬀshoring Skill-Intensive Tasks
Much of the recent public debate about oﬀshoring concerns the relocation of white-collar jobs.
The media has identiﬁed many tasks requiring reasonably high levels of skill that formerly
were the sole providence of the advanced economies but now are being performed oﬀshore.
For example, workers in India are reported to be reading x-rays (Pollak, 2003), developing
software (Thurm, 2004), preparing tax forms (Robertson et al., 2005), and even performing
heart surgery on American patients (Baker et al., 2006). In this section, we extend our model
to include trade in such tasks.
We introduce the possibility of oﬀshoring tasks performed by high-skilled workers in the
setting of a small Heckscher-Ohlin economy. Let βftf(i) denote the ratio of the input of
foreign factor f needed to perform the f-task with index i at a given intensity to the domestic
input of factor f needed to perform the same task at the same intensity, for f = {L,H}.W e
assume that the two industries share the same schedules of oﬀshoring costs, although it would
be straightforward to allow for cross-sectoral var i a t i o ni nt h e s ec o s t s ,a sw eh a v ei l l u s t r a t e d
before.
Now, If is the marginal task using factor f that is performed oﬀshore. For low-skilled
21For example, if the technology for producing good X is Cobb-Douglas, the foreign wage w
∗ is suﬃciently
low, and limi→1 t
0(i)/t(i)=∞, then the equilibrium domestic wage of low-skilled workers is higher for β
suﬃciently low (and, therefore, I>0)t h a nw h e nI =0 .
24labor, we have
w = w∗βLtL(IL) ,( 1 7 )
as before. The analogous condition for high-skilled labor is
s = s∗βHtH(IH) .( 1 8 )
If home ﬁrms produce both goods, the zero-proﬁt conditions imply
1=ΩLwaLx (ΩLw/ΩHs)+ΩHsaHx(ΩLw/ΩHs) (19)
and
p = ΩLwaLy (ΩLw/ΩHs)+ΩHsaHy(ΩLw/ΩHs) ,( 2 0 )
where




for f = {L,H}. Together, (17) - (20) determine w, s, IL and IH,g i v e nw∗, s∗ and p,w h i c h
the small country takes as given.
But, in fact, (19) and (20) determine ΩLw and ΩHs independently of βL and βH.T h e r e -
fore, as long as the country remains incompletely specialized, a fall in the cost of oﬀshoring
one or both types of task leaves ΩLw and ΩHs unchanged. It follows that
ˆ w = −ˆ ΩL
and
ˆ s = −ˆ ΩH ,
with dΩL/dβL > 0, dΩH/dβL =0 , dΩH/dβH > 0,a n ddΩL/dβH =0 . That is, an improve-
ment in the technology for oﬀshoring L-tasks generates as before a productivity gain for
low-skilled workers and a rise in their wages, but has no eﬀect on the extent of oﬀshoring of
H-tasks or the wages of high-skilled workers. Similarly, a reduction in the cost of oﬀshoring
high-skilled jobs spurs additional oﬀshoring of H-tasks, with attendant productivity gains for
domestic high-skilled workers and an increase in their wages. Such changes in communication
and transportation technologies do not aﬀect the allocation of low-skilled tasks or the wages
of low-skilled workers in this setting.
25We can also analyze the oﬀshoring of H-tasks in a large economy or one that is specialized
in producing a single good. In the large economy, a fall in βH alone generates a relative-price
eﬀect that beneﬁts low-skilled labor and harms high-skilled labor. In the specialized economy,
such technological change induces a factor-supply eﬀect that has these same distributional
consequences.
An interesting special case arises when the distribution of trading costs for H-tasks is
t h es a m ea st h a tf o rL-tasks and improvements in communications technology shift both
schedules down symmetrically; i.e., tL(·)=tH(·)=t(·) and βL = βH = β. Suppose the home
country is large, as in Section 3.2, and that it enjoys an economy-wide productivity advantage
vis-à-vis its trading partner, as captured by A∗ > 1. Then, if both countries are incompletely
specialized, adjusted factor price equalization implies ΩLw = A∗w∗ and ΩHs = A∗s∗,w h e r e
ΩL = Ω(IL) and ΩH = Ω(IH). We can substitute for w∗ using (17) and for s∗ using (18),
which gives βt(IL)Ω(IL)=A∗ = βt(IH)Ω(IH),o rIL = IH. That is, the extent of equilibrium
oﬀshoring is the same for the two types of tasks.22
When trade costs fall, the fraction of tasks of each type that is performed oﬀshore increases
to the same extent. Then −ˆ ΩL = −ˆ ΩH > 0; i.e., both factors enjoy similar productivity gains.
The reduction in oﬀshoring costs is like uniform factor-augmenting technological progress,
or, equivalently, uniform Hicks-neutral technological progress in both industries. However,
this does not generate uniform growth in factor prices. Rather, the uniform expansion in
productivity in the (skill abundant) home economy causes an expansion in relative world
output of the skill-intensive good at the initial world price and thus a deterioration in the
home country’s terms of trade. The induced rise in p produces a relative-price eﬀect that
further boosts the wage gain for low-skilled labor, but mitigates (or, possibly, reverses) that
for their high-skilled counterparts.
22Note that βL = βH and tL(·)=tH(·) are not enough to ensure that an economy oﬀshores the same
fraction of L-tasks as H-tasks, because the relative cost of one factor may be higher or lower in the foreign
country than in the home country when IL = IH.S o , f o r e x a m p l e , ﬁrms in a small economy typically will
not oﬀshore L-tasks and H-tasks to the same extent even when the distributions of oﬀshoring costs are the
same, unless w
∗/s
∗ takes on a particular value. But, with uniform productivity diﬀerences across a pair of
large countries and adjusted factor price equalization, the relative factor prices in both countries are in fact
the same when IL = IH.
265C o n c l u s i o n
The nature of trade has changed dramatically over the last two centuries. Whereas trade
historically has involved an exchange of complete goods, today it increasingly entails diﬀerent
countries adding value to global supply chains. We have introduced the term “task trade”
to describe this ﬁner international division of labor and to distinguish it from goods trade,
with its coarser patterns of specialization. Although the globalization of production has been
discussed extensively in formal and informal writings, there has been no simple paradigm
with which to study this new international organization of supply and its consequences for
prices, resource allocation, and welfare. In this paper, we have proposed such a paradigm
that casts task trade as star while relegating goods trade to a supporting role.
Our shifted emphasis generates insights that are surprising from the perspective of tradi-
tional theories in which only goods are traded. In particular, we have identiﬁed a productivity
eﬀect that results from improvements in the technology for trading tasks. A decline in the
cost of task trade has eﬀects much like factor-augmenting technological progress. That is,
it directly boosts the productivity of the factor whose tasks become easier to move oﬀshore.
If the ensuing adjustment in relative prices is not too large or its impact on factor prices is
not too powerful, all domestic parties can share in the gains from improved opportunities
for oﬀshoring. In contrast, several familiar trade theories predict an inevitable conﬂict of
interests when the cost of trading goods falls.
Our conceptualization of the global production process in terms of traded tasks yields
dividends in a parsimonious analysis of the distributional implications of oﬀshoring. Of
course, in developing our speciﬁc model of task trade, we have imposed several restrictions on
the available production and trade technologies. We believe that two of these restrictions are
especially important and hope to relax them in future research. First, our speciﬁc production
technology limits the potential patterns of complementarity between tasks. We have allowed
for any degree of substitution or complementarity between the set of tasks performed by some
factor and the set performed by another factor. But we have not incorporated the possibility
that some subset of the tasks carried out by a given factor are especially complementary
to a particular subset of those discharged by another. Such circumstances can arise when
the technology requires certain groups of tasks to be performed in closed proximity. For
example, the tasks performed by a nurse during surgery are most valuable when the surgeon
is nearby. Similarly, technicians who are engaged in data entry are most productive when
27their computers are close at hand. To capture such complementarities, we need to enrich the
cost functions for oﬀshoring to allow for interdependencies between subsets of tasks.
Second, we have assumed throughout our analysis that transporting partially processed
goods is costless. That is, we have included in our model the cost that arises from having
a task performed remotely, but not the cost that may result from shipping the cumulative
product of a subset of tasks. Our assumptions capture well the sorts of task trade that is
conveyed electronically and increasingly ﬁts a world in which many physical components can
be transported at relatively low cost. However, in circumstances in which sets of tasks result
in intermediate goods that are costly to move, a ﬁrm may need to consider grouping tasks so
as to economize on shipping costs. We would like to incorporate such considerations in our
future research, but suspect that this task may prove to be challenging.
We hope that the ﬂexibility and tractability of our approach to task trade will render it
useful for addressing additional questions. For example, one might reconsider the tenets of
trade policy. When oﬀshoring is possible, optimal policy should target tasks, not goods. This
suggests that trade taxes should be levied on imported and exported value added, not on the
full value of traded goods. Moreover, the non-physical nature of much of this trade raises
enforcement problems for the tax authorities. So, one might study the nature of second-best
tariﬀs and export taxes on goods in the presence of task trade and assess the losses that
result from the failure to tax value added and the inability to tax some tasks at all.
On the empirical side, we would dearly like to assess the magnitudes of the productivity,
relative-price, and labor-supply eﬀects. However, research aimed at measuring these eﬀects
faces a daunting challenge inasmuch as almost all current trade data pertain to gross ﬂows
rather than to value added. The globalization of production processes mandates a new ap-
proach to trade data collection, one that records international transactions much like domestic
transactions have been recorded for many years.
286A p p e n d i x
In this appendix, we extend the analysis to include the possibility that the oﬀshoring cost
schedule, t(i),h a sﬂat portions along which t0(i)=0 . Recall that we normalized the measure
of tasks to one and assumed that all tasks using a given factor require the same input
of that factor when performed at home. This normalization is without loss of generality,
provided that we can divide any bigger task into subtasks and assign multiple indexes to
them. However, in doing so, the possibility arises that several of these subtasks will be bear
t h es a m eo ﬀshoring costs. So, we need to allow for ﬂats in the t(i) schedule to accommodate
tasks of diﬀerent sizes. We proceed to reconsider the small Heckscher-Ohlin economy, the
large Heckscher-Ohlin economy and the small, specialized economy, following the progression
of Section 3.
To make our points, it suﬃces to consider a t(i) schedule with one ﬂat portion for i ∈
[i1,i 2];i . e . ,t0(i) > 0 for i<i 1, t0(i)=0for i1 <i<i 2 and t0(i) > 0 for i>i 2.W ec o n t i n u e
to assume that t(i) is continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere except at i1 and i2.
6.1 Small Heckscher-Ohlin Economy
For the small Heckscher-Ohlin economy, we will substantiate the following claims: (1) the
low-skill wage is a continuous and everywhere decreasing function of β, possibly with a kink;
(2) there is a unique value of β that we denote by β12 for which the equilibrium I may fall
on the ﬂat portion of the t(i) schedule; (3) for β = β12, there are multiple equilibria with
I ranging from i1 to i2; and (4) the correspondence between I and β is discontinuous at
β = β12, but continuous elsewhere. In other words, the equilibrium “almost never” falls on
the ﬂat portion of t(i) and, even if it does, our conclusions about the beneﬁcial wage eﬀects
of an improvement in the oﬀshoring technology apply for all parameter values.
Before proving these claims, we seek to clarify them further in two ﬁgures. Figure 1 shows
the wage of low-skilled workers as a function of β. For high values of β such that β>β 12,
there is little oﬀshoring (I<i 1). In such circumstances a decline in β leads to an expansion
of the range of tasks performed oﬀshore, as shown in Figure 2, and an increase in the low-skill
wage. The wage increase matches the productivity eﬀect, which can be calculated using the
formula in the main text. As β falls further, it reaches the unique value β12 at which the
equilibrium I can fall anywhere along the vertical section of the curve shown in Figure 2.
All of these equilibria share the same factor prices but diﬀer in resource allocation. However,
29as β falls from just above β12 to just below this value, the wage response is continuous, as
depicted in Figure 1. For further reductions in β, the analysis mirrors that in the main text.
Notice that Figure 1 displays a kink in the wage function at β = β12. Such a kink exists if












30To prove that I and w m u s tr e s p o n dt oad e c l i n ei nβ as depicted in the ﬁgures, suppose
to the contrary that the equilibrium I varies smoothly with β in the range where I ∈ (i1,i 2);
i.e., dI/dβ is ﬁnite for I ∈ (i1,i 2).F o rI in this range, t0(I)dI/dβ =0 ,s oΩ0(I)dI/dβ =0 .
Then (8) and (9) imply that ˆ w/ˆ β =0 . But (1) implies that ˆ w = ˆ β +t0(I)(dI/dβ)/t(I)=ˆ β.,
or ˆ w/ˆ β =1 . This is a contradiction, so dI/dβ = ∞ for all I ∈ (i1,i 2), as shown in Figure 2.
At β = β12, I ∈ [i1,i 2] and t(I)=t(i1)=t(i2). Therefore23, Ω(I)=Ω(i1)=Ω(i2)
and so (8) and (9) are satisﬁed for a common (w,s) for all I ∈ [i1,i 2]. There are multiple
equilibria with the same factor prices but diﬀerent values of x and y to satisfy (4) and (5).
Then, as β falls from β12 to something a bit smaller, I increases from an arbitrary point
in [i1,i2] to a point just outside that region, which means that t(I) rises, as does −Ω(I).
Thus, the wage must rise (smoothly) for (8) and (9) to be satisﬁed. Moreover, let us deﬁne
dΩ(I)=Ω(I + dI) − Ω(I) for I ∈ [i1,i 2], where (with slight abuse of notation) dI includes
both the jump to the edge of the ﬂat region and the small change in I that results when β
falls slightly below β12.T h e nˆ w = −ˆ Ω(I) for all values of I,j u s ta sb e f o r e .
6.2 Large Heckscher-Ohlin Economy
In a large economy, the relative price adjusts to a fall in β. Nonetheless, we can show that w is
a continuous and everywhere decreasing function of β in this environment as well. Moreover,
there is a unique value of β for which the equilibrium I m a yf a l lo nt h eﬂat portion of the
t(i) schedule and the correspondence between I and β is discontinuous at this point.
The argument is similar to that in the previous section. Suppose again that dI/dβ is ﬁnite
for I ∈ (i1,i 2),s ot h a tt0(I)dI/dβ = Ω0(I)dI/dβ =0 . By (12) and (13), the fact that Ω is
constant implies that (x + x∗)/(y + y∗) is constant, which in turn implies that p is constant.
With p constant, Ω constant, and no labor-supply eﬀect, (6) implies that ˆ w =0 . But (10),
(11) and ˆ p =0imply that ˆ w∗ =0 . Again, we must have ˆ w =ˆ w∗ + ˆ β + t0(I)(dI/dβ)/t(I)
23Note that, for I ∈ (i1,i 2),




=1 − I +
U i1
0 t(i)di +( I − i1)t(i1)
t(i1)





which is independent of I.
31by the optimality condition for oﬀshoring, which with ˆ w∗ = t0(I)=0implies ˆ w = ˆ β.S ow e
have the same sort of contradiction as before. We conclude that our analysis in Section 3.2
of the large Heckscher-Ohlin economy carries over to the case in which t0(i) has ﬂat portions.
6.3 Small, Specialized Economy
Finally we consider a small country that produces a single good, so that the labor-supply
eﬀect operates. In this case, contrary to the previous two, it is possible for I to vary smoothly
with changes in β when I ∈ (i1,i2).W h e nI is on the ﬂat portion of the t(i) schedule, a change
in β generates a labor-supply eﬀe c tt h a tc a u s e st h el o w - s k i l lw a g et of a l lb yt h ef u l le x t e n t
of the shift in the oﬀshoring cost schedule; i.e., ˆ w = ˆ β. Then, ∞ >d I / d β>0, but since
t0(i)=0for I ∈ (i1,i2), w = βt(I)w∗ continues to be satisﬁed. The change in I can be solved









Now, as long as I remains on the ﬂat portion of t(i), the productivity eﬀect of an improvement
in the oﬀshoring technology is nil and low-skill wage falls.
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